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Conceptualizing Terrorism 
 
Introduction 
It is widely recognised that defining terrorism has been an issue that has confounded 
policymakers and academics alike. For some, such definitional exploits are not worth the 
effort as the prospects for a universally agreed definition are remote indeed. While there have 
always been very good reasons for aspiring to reach such a definition from both a 
policymaking and an academic perspective, this article argues that there are further reasons 
for doing so in the post-9/11 environment. It will then propose three preliminary assumptions 
when approaching the definitional problem – that there is no such thing as an act of violence 
that is in and of itself inherently terrorist, that terrorism is best conceptualized as a particular 
method of political violence rather than defined as inherent to any particular ideology or 
perpetrator, and that non-civilians and combatants can also be victims of terrorism. The 
article will then draw out the implications that these assumptions have for the definitional 
debate.  
The need to re-focus on the definition? 
There have always been good reasons for attempting to generate a universally agreed 
definition of terrorism. From a policymaking perspective the most important of these have 
been to do with the facilitation of international cooperation against the phenomenon,1 while 
from an academic perspective there has been an acknowledged need to advance theoretical 
development as to ‘what terrorism is’. Often used as a perjorative label, a common and 
formidable obstacle to an agreed definition has been its subjective application (or non-
application) according to where one’s interests lie, and this has obfuscated a more 
dispassionate and analytical approach.  
Even before 9/11 ‘[t]he term terrorism [was] so widely used in many contexts as to become 
almost meaningless’2, while Conor Gearty remarked in 1991 that ‘[t]he word resonates with 
moral opprobrium and as such is, as far as the authorities and others are concerned, far too 
useful an insult to be pinned down and controlled’3. Yet, since the events of September 2001 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Alex P. Schmid, ‘Terrorism – The Definitional Problem’, Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law, Volume 36, Nos. 2 and 3, 2004, pp. 379-80, adapted from: Boaz Ganor, ‘Defining 
Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?’, International Institute for Counter-
Terrorism, August 1998, webpage: 
http://www.ict.org.il/ResearchPublications/tabid/64/Articlsid/432/Default.aspx (accessed November 6th 2013); 
European Commission Sixth Framework Programme Project, ‘Defining Terrorism’ (WP3 Deliverable 4), 
October 1st 2008, available at: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP3%20Del%204.pdf 
(accessed November 6th 2013). 
2 Richardson, L., ‘Terrorists as Transnational Actors’, Taylor, M., and Horgan, J. (eds.), The Future of 
Terrorism, Frank Cass, 2000, p. 209. 
3 Gearty, C., Terror, Faber and Faber, London, 199, p. 6. 
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it has been employed so widely and carelessly in public and political discourse that there 
appears to be a wholesale disregard for any serious endeavour to treat terrorism as an 
analytical concept. Richard English, in his incisive work on how to respond to terrorism, 
argued that the subjective use of the term has meant that ‘one can end up merely with 
antiphonally chanted, mutually echoing abuse, and as a result with little clarity or analytical 
illumination.’4  
‘Terrorism’ has been coined to refer to protestors in Thailand, Tunisia and Libya5, to the 
Israeli attack on a flotilla of ships attempting to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza, to the US 
invasion of Iraq and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon,6 to US drone attacks in Pakistan, to 
Western and NATO airstrikes against Libya, to Syrian rebels attempting to overthrow the 
Assad regime, and to Wikileaks founder Julian Assange who was described by US Senator 
Mitch McConnell as a ‘high-tech terrorist’.7 Whether or not any or all of these should be 
classified as terrorism (or terrorists) the point is that the label is all too often used without any 
real rigour as to what terrorism is and what its parameters are. Martha Crenshaw, a respected 
scholar in the field, has argued that ‘the term is often used in a careless or perjorative way for 
rhetorical reasons’,8 while a UN High Level Panel in 2004 lamented that ‘a lack of agreement 
on a clear and well known definition undermines the moral and normative stance against 
terrorism and has stained the United Nations image’.9  
The failure to craft an agreed definition of terrorism has left a vacuum for actors, whether 
they be state or non-state, to define terrorism in ways that serve their own perceived political 
and strategic interests, and, in the case of state responses, remits of ‘counter-terrorism’ are 
often determined accordingly. As one observer has noted ‘the more confused a concept, the 
more it lends itself to opportunistic appropriation’.10 This undermines attempts to generate 
international cooperation against terrorism and can lead to unilateral and (even if unwittingly) 
counter-productive strategies. Indeed, some have suggested that the failure to define the 
concept is itself a cause of terrorism. Schmid, for example, has argued that ‘a lack of 
definition is perceived widely as one of the factors likely to encourage future terrorism’, and 
cites a study that places the absence of such a definition at the top of a list of ten factors and 
conditions ‘likely to encourage future terrorism’.11  
 
                                                            
4 English, R., Terrorism, How to Respond, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 19. 
5 A Libyan government statement in February 2011 reportedly described protestors as "terrorist gangs made up 
mostly of misguided youths", who had been exploited and fed "hallucinogenic pills" by people following 
foreign agendas. See ‘Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi appears on state TV’, BBC News, February 11th 2011, available at  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12533069 (accessed  November 6th 2013). 
6 Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Routledge, London and New York, 2011, 
p. 88. 
7 See, for example, Chittal, N., ‘Sen. Mitch McConnell: Julian Assange is a “High Tech Terrorist”’, Mediaite 
website, December 5th 2010, available at: http://www.mediaite.com/tv/mitch-mcconnell-julian-assange-is-a-
high-tech-terrorist/ (accessed November 6th 2013). 
8 Crenshaw, M., Explaining Terrorism, Causes, Processes and Consequences, Routledge, 2011, p. 206. 
9 Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, December 2nd 2004, 
p. 48, available at: http://www.unrol.org/doc.aspx?n=gaA.59.565_En.pdf  (accessed November 6th 2013).  
10 Saul, B., Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 3. 
11 Op. cit. Schmid, A., ‘Terrorism – The Definitional Problem’, p. 378 (note 1). 
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From a legal perspective, Golder and Williams argued for the need to ‘describe the concept 
with as much precision as possible. One danger is that if terrorism is not so defined, the 
powers of the State may extend very far indeed’,12 while it has also been suggested that ‘the 
absence of an internationally accepted definition of terrorism has led to international 
lawlessness and unilateral vigilantism.’13At the very least, then, the failure to define 
terrorism, both in academia and policymaking, has made its own contribution to dubious 
counter-terrorism responses. The first reason, then, for persisting with the definition of 
terrorism, or at least an agreed conceptualization of the term, is that the term has more than 
ever before been open to abuse. Indeed, ‘the post-9/11 response to terrorism has been both 
analytically and practically flawed in a very dangerous manner’ and this analytical failure has 
‘significantly exacerbated’ the failures in the practical realm.14  
 
While legal practitioners call for a precise definition in order to prosecute terrorist crimes it is 
the political abuse of the term that has taken on profound and ominous proportions since 
9/11, and the nature of legislative responses are but one symptom of this. In 2004 Sami 
Zeidan cautioned that ‘the political value of the term currently prevails over its legal one ... 
leaving the [then] war against terrorism selective, incomplete and ineffective.’15 Charles 
Townshend argued that ‘the indefinite reach of President Bush’s ‘war against terror’ 
underlined more sharply than ever the need for some definition – or compartmentalization – 
of this manipulable term.’16 For the concept has indeed been available as a ‘free for all’ label 
for any actor who wishes to denounce the activities of their political adversaries for as long as 
there is no general conviction as to what terrorism really means or what its parameters are. 
 
The second reason for persevering with the definition of terrorism is that, within academia, 
the phenomenon is seen as something in its ‘pre-theory stage’ or to put it more candidly as 
something that ‘is widely recognized as theoretically impoverished’17, even in the 
contemporary context of what is otherwise a burgeoning literature on terrorism since 9/11. 
The lack of theoretical endeavour as to ‘what terrorism is’ has rendered much of terrorism 
research as foundationally weak.  Silke outlines the academic benefits of achieving consensus 
on the meaning of the concept:  
‘An agreed definition allows the research world to develop shared methods, 
approaches, benchmarks and appropriate topics for study. Without a definition, the 
                                                            
12 Golder, B. And Williams, G., ‘What is Terrorism – Problems of Legal Definition’, University of New South 
Wales Law Journal, Volume 27, Issue 2, 2004, p. 272. 
13 Acharya, U., ‘War on Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terrorism’, Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, Volume 37, Issue 4, 2008-2009, p. 678. 
14 Op. cit. English, R. pp. ix-x (note 4). 
15 Zeidan, S., ‘Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community’s Quest for Identifying the Specter 
of Terrorism’, Cornell International Law Journal, No. 36 (2003-2004), pp. 491-2. 
16 Townshend, C., Terrorism, A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 2. 
17 Crenshaw, M., ‘Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective’, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Volume 15, No. 1, 1992, p. 1. 
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focus of the field is scattered and fragmented, and an unrealistic range of activities, 
phenomena and actors have been labelled as terrorist.’18 
It therefore seems strange that there has been such scant attention on the definitional issue in 
research on terrorism. Silke, in his analysis of the main academic terrorism journals in the 
period 1990-99, found that ‘[o]f the 490 articles published in the ten-year period, just eight 
(1.6 per cent) could be regarded as primarily conceptual papers’19, while in the period 2000-7 
‘there were only seven articles on definitional aspects’.20 Another researcher noted in 2007 
that ‘[given] the exceptional salience and policy relevance of this concept, it is surprising to 
see that over 77% of scholars in leading political science journals who focus on terrorism fail 
to define it, and many of the remaining 23% offer definitions of their own without paying due 
consideration to the implications of their conceptual choices.’21 Why, given the importance of 
an agreed definition of terrorism and the serious inhibitions of a lack of one, is there such 
academic paucity on the issue? Silke suggests the following may be the case: 
 
‘that there seems to be something of a war-weariness among established researchers 
over the definitional quagmire. Everyone is by now very familiar with the huge 
difficulties faced by any attempt to achieve consensus, and, rather than continue to 
struggle for the nebulous goal of an agreed framework, researchers seem to have 
resigned themselves to accepting the current state of uncertainty and to allow 
everyone to work within their own more limited frameworks.’22  
 
He goes on to argue that ‘the lack of conceptual/definitional agreement is having some 
damaging impact’ and that the field has become ‘extremely applied’: 
 
‘This can be seen not only in the very small number of writers and articles which 
tackle conceptual issues full-on, but also in other respects. For example, the field is 
almost entirely focused on issues of immediate, real-world relevance. The papers are 
about terrorist groups which are currently active, about current or imminent threats, or 
are focused on regions with recent or current experience of terrorist violence. There is 
virtually no effort to set terrorism within a broader context. .... this wider context is 
almost entirely ignored as terrorism research is driven by a need to provide a short-
term, immediate assessment of current groups and threats. Efforts to establish 
coherent and stable guiding principles have been almost entirely side-lined. This is a 
                                                            
18 Silke, A., ‘An Introduction to Terrorism Research’, in Silke, A., (ed.), Research on Terrorism, Trends, 
Achievements and Failures, Frank Cass, London, 2004, p. 4. 
19 Silke, A., ‘The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research’, in Silke, A., (ed.), Research on 
Terrorism, Trends, Achievements and Failures, Frank Cass, London, 2004, p. 207. 
20 Ranstorp, M., ‘Mapping terrorism studies after 9/11’, in Jackson, R., Breen Smyth, M., and Gunning, J., 
Critical Terrorism Studies, Routledge, 2009, p. 23. 
21 Bogatyrenko, O., ‘Definitional Analysis of Terrorism: Constructing Concepts and Populations for Social 
Science Research’, paper prepared for 2007 meeting of the International Studies Association, February-March 
2007, p. 2, cited in Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, Routledge, London and 
New York, 2011, p. 90. 
22 Op. cit. Silke, A., ‘The Road Less Travelled: Recent Trends in Terrorism Research’, p. 208 (note 19). 
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serious cause for concern and is an issue which the more committed researchers will 
hopefully turn increased attention towards.’23 
 
‘Stable and guiding principles’ and the quest for greater conceptual development have 
therefore been at the mercy of the immediate concerns and sometimes knee-jerk reactions of 
policymakers (and often, therefore, of academics) to the latest terrorist atrocity. There is a 
real need for a commitment to the conceptual development of terrorism - so that any ultimate 
conceptualization of terrorism is sustainable, and is able to withstand the constant buffeting 
of the exigencies of the day and of research efforts rather narrowly being ‘driven very much 
by issues of contemporary relevance’ of concern to ‘western democracies’ and the USA.24 
For example, a definition of terrorism should not simply be moulded by whatever the 
adversary of the day is doing – by, for instance, automatically including whatever the latest 
mode of activity that Al Qaeda is engaged with. Schmid, for instance, refers to the ‘faulty 
circular reasoning’ behind the view that ‘once a group has been designated ‘terrorist’, all acts 
of violence by members of that group are ‘terrorist’’.25 Rather, acts of violence should be 
measured and assessed against a set of criteria that have been carefully considered and 
established to determine whether or not acts of violence constitute terrorism. 
Linked to the notion of the use of ‘terrorism’ as a delegitimising tool by those in power is a 
third reason for focusing on the definition of terrorism. The emergence of critical 
perspectives within terrorism studies (often referred to as Critical Terrorism Studies or CTS) 
have posed questions as to how terrorism has ‘traditionally’ been studied and also, by 
implication, how it has been defined. There are, of course, many interpretations as to what it 
means to be ‘critical’26, though in general this author prefers to see ‘being critical’ as a 
practice rather than signifying membership of one or other particular genre or school of 
thought. It is presumably a practice that all serious terrorism scholars engage in (and in this 
sense one should caution against the exclusive [mis]appropriation of the word ‘critical’ to a 
particular body of scholars). That said, some important perspectives have emerged from 
‘Critical Terrorism Studies’ that need to be considered in any discussion on the definition of 
terrorism – not least that so-called ‘orthodox’ or ‘traditional’ terrorism studies has tended to 
exclude the state (especially democratic states) as potential perpetrators in definitions of 
terrorism.27  
 
A fourth important reason for re-focusing on the definitional debate (and one that is not 
always acknowledged) is that any serious undertaking to theorise ‘what terrorism is’ is also 
inherently an endeavour to understand the phenomenon. As English has argued, any 
explanation and understanding of terrorism ‘can be developed only if we clearly, credibly, 
                                                            
23 Ibid. p. 208-9. 
24 Ibid. p. 210. 
25 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 64 (note 6). 
26 See, for example, Gunning, J., ‘Babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies’, 
European Political Science, Palgrave Macmillan, Volume 6, No. 3, September 2007, p. 238. 
27 Although the acknowledgement that states have been by far the worst perpetrators of ‘terror’ is certainly not 
new, and nor is the particular focus within CTS on democratic states as culpable. 
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plausibly, and honestly define the phenomenon that we actually face.’28 This article, for 
example, aims to generate an understanding of terrorism as a particular method of violence 
rather than defined as something that is peculiar or inherent to particular types of perpetrator, 
ideology or cause. There are a wide range of actors that have used the method of terrorism 
whether they be terrorist groups or networks, states, guerrilla groups, extreme fringes of 
social movements and so on. In other words if we are scrutinising the activities of just 
terrorist organisations we are only considering part of the terrorism picture. Similarly, acts of 
terrorism have been carried out in the name of a variety of different causes or ideologies, 
most of them not inherently violent (or, more specifically, not terrorist).  
 
A fifth related reason is that it has been argued by the author elsewhere that the concept of 
‘radicalization’, it turns out, has not been a particularly useful one upon which to base a 
counter-terrorist strategy.29 It has not been clear as to who the radicalized are and responses 
in the UK in recent years have at times confusingly oscillated between tackling ‘violent 
extremism’ in particular to promoting ‘shared values’. Indeed, the contention here is that the 
concept of ‘radicalization’ should be dropped and that the focus should return to what people 
do rather than the way they think – in other words there needs to be a refocus on (the method 
of) terrorism and not on more opaque notions of radicalization or on non-violent (but 
‘extremist’) ideologies.30 Having been critical of the fact that there has been little consensus 
as to what is meant by radicalization it seems therefore natural that calls for a refocus on 
terrorism should also come with a commitment to revisiting the definition of the term and to 
reassessing its own conceptual dilemmas, for, like radicalization, it is very difficult to 
respond to something if one cannot agree on what that something is.  
 
The difficulty in defining terrorism 
Yet, defining terrorism is no easy task. Indeed, for some academics, it is an endeavour that is 
hardly worthy of serious contemplation as any attempt to secure agreement on a definition 
has thus far proved to be a fruitless exercise. The view is that any such aspiration will 
continue to disappoint and is therefore not worth the effort. Walter Laqueur wrote that, 
although ‘terrorism is an unmistakeable phenomenon … the search for a scientific, all-
comprehensive definition is a futile enterprise’31, while Edward Said remarked: 
‘The use of the word terrorism is usually unfocused, it usually has all kinds of implicit 
validations of one’s own brand of violence, it’s highly selective. If you accept this 
                                                            
28 Op. cit. English, R., p. ix (note 4) 
29 Richards, A., ‘The problem with ‘radicalization’, the remit of ‘Prevent’, and the need to refocus on terrorism 
in the UK’, International Affairs, (January, 2011). 
30 See ‘Contest: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism’, July 2011, available at: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-terrorism-strategy/strategy-
contest?view=Binary , (accessed November 6th 2013); and ‘Prevent Strategy’, June 2011, available at: 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-
review?view=Binary (accessed November 6th 2013). 
31 Walter Laqueur, No End to War, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, Continuum International, 2004, 
p.238. 
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norm, then it becomes so universally applicable that it loses any force whatsoever. I 
think it is best to drop it.’32 
Another argued that ‘a definition of terrorism is hopeless … terrorism is just violence that 
you don’t like’33 while Silke cautioned that the field is ‘bogged down in conceptual mire’ and 
that answers to what appear to be fairly basic questions (such as what is terrorism and what 
makes an act a terrorist act?) continue to be elusive.34 He summed up the general fatigue over 
the issue: 
‘For some, the definition debate is a hugely wasteful quagmire, undeserving of the 
energy it has swallowed over the years. Many experienced commentators hold such 
opinions. Weary of the heated and largely fruitless debates of the 1970s and 1980s, 
they view the necessity of a shared definition with a jaundiced eye, and consider the 
research effort expended on such efforts would be better applied to other more 
amenable issues.’35 
 
From a policymaking perspective, senior figures also found the challenge of defining 
terrorism daunting. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in his review of terrorism legislation in the 
United Kingdom in 1996, conceded that ‘there are great difficulties in finding a satisfactory 
definition. Indeed, I was unable to do so and I suspect that none of us will succeed.’36 Lord 
Carlile, reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK from September 2001 to 2011 
conceded that ‘[h]ard as I have striven, and as many definitions as I have read, I have failed 
to conclude that there is one that I could regard as the paradigm. Unsurprisingly, I have been 
unable to achieve what was not achieved by Lord Lloyd – perhaps because it is not possible 
to do so.’37 Yet, as Golder and Williams noted above, and as a European Commission Sixth 
Framework Programme Project on defining terrorism also remarked, there is from a legal 
perspective a need for precision and certainty.38 
 
Laqueur, however, cautions those engaged in such a conceptual pursuit arguing that 
‘terrorism is dangerous ground for simplificateurs and generalisateurs’39 while others have 
proclaimed that ‘it is unlikely that any definition will ever be generally agreed upon’ 
                                                            
32 Edward Said, cited in ‘Environmental Terrorism: A Critique’ by Shannon O’Lear in Stanley D. Brunn (ed.), 
11 September and its Aftermath, Frank Cass, 2004, p. 132. 
33 R. E. Rubenstein, cited in op. cit. Schmid, A., ‘Terrorism – The Definitional Problem’, p. 397 (note 1). 
34 Silke, A., ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Volume 13, No. 4, 2001, p.2. 
35 Op. cit. Silke, A., ‘An Introduction to Terrorism Research’ p. 3 (note 18). 
36 Lord Lloyd of Berwick, cited in Carlile, A., The Definition of Terrorism, March 15th 2007, p. 4, available at: 
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7052/7052.pdf (accessed November 6th 2013). 
37 Carlile, A., The Definition of Terrorism, March 15th 2007, p.4, available at: http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm70/7052/7052.pdf (accessed November 6th 2013). 
38 Op. cit. European Commission Sixth Framework Programme Project, ‘Defining Terrorism’ (note 1). 
39 Laqueur, W., quoted in op. cit. Schmid, A., ‘Terrorism – The Definitional Problem’, p. 378 (note 1). 
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(authors’ italics)40, and another  has written of the ‘The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism’.41 
In 1986, Levitt summed up the challenge for those who set out to achieve the seemingly 
impossible: 
 
‘The search for a legal definition of terrorism in some ways resembles the quest for 
the Holy Grail: periodically, eager souls set out, full of purpose, energy and self-
confidence, to succeed where so many others before have tried and failed. Some, 
daunted by the difficulties and dangers along the way, give up, often declaring the 
quest meaningless. Others return claiming victory, proudly bearing an object they 
insist is the real thing but which to everyone else looks more like the same old used 
cup, perhaps re-decorated in a slightly original way. Still others, soberly assessing the 
risks, costs and benefits attendant upon the attempt, never set out at all, preferring to 
devote their energies to humbler but possibly more practical tasks. But the long record 
of frustrations and failures often seems to spur further efforts; the 99th [United 
Nations] Congress, for example, saw a dozen bills containing various attempts at 
legislative definitions of terrorism.’42 
 
Defining terrorism has thus been a controversial endeavour that has perplexed both 
academics and policymakers. The political, subjective and perjorative use of the term has 
rendered any prospect of achieving a universally agreed definition as remote indeed, and, as 
such, continued deliberation over the meaning of terrorism is often seen as a stale and 
redundant exercise.  
 
This may especially be the case when one has to acknowledge that terrorism, like any social 
science concept, is ultimately a social construction and so there is, one has to concede, 
something of a paradox in trying to be definitive about it. As an ‘ontologically unstable’ term 
terrorism, therefore, hardly represents a ‘brute fact’.43 Its social construction means that in 
theory terrorism can indeed be whatever one says it is and that it therefore comes down to 
who has the power to define or who ‘is heard the loudest’. It is also therefore the case that 
those who claim that the term has been abused are by definition themselves culpable of 
making some sort of knowledge claim as to what terrorism is and what it is not.  
 
Such is the dilemma with all social science concepts – all of which have been socially 
constructed and whose meanings and applications have changed over time. But does this 
mean that, because we cannot speak ‘truth’ in defining these concepts, that we should 
abandon attempts to capture their meaning in historical and contemporary contexts? The 
answer is surely a resounding ‘no’ because not only do the meanings attributed to such 
                                                            
40 Shafritz et al, cited in Silke, A., ‘Terrorism and the Blind Men’s Elephant’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 
Volume 8, No. 3, 1996, p. 13. 
41 Fletcher, G., ‘The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 4, 
No. 5 (2006). 
42 Levitt, G., ‘Is Terrorism Worth Defining?’, Ohio Northern University Law Review, Volume 13 (1986), No. 1, 
p. 97. 
43 Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., and Breen Smyth, M., Terrorism, A Critical Introduction, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011, p. 119. 
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concepts, like terrorism, often have major ‘real-life’ consequences but every academic 
discipline requires a degree of conceptual clarity to guide research. Otherwise, Wight has 
cautioned, terrorism research ‘will always tend to drift into a form of journalistic 
speculation’.44 Moreover, as English has noted, ‘the fact is that this word is simply not going 
to disappear from the political vocabulary (it is far too useful to too many people for this to 
occur), and so we should probably retain our commitment to establishing precise, coherent 
definitions of the word, rather than merely jettisoning it,’45 and, as Schmid argues, ‘giving up 
on the scholarly debate would leave the field to those who simply hold that ‘[t]errorism is 
what the bad guys do’ (B.M. Jenkins), or ‘one man’s terrorist is the other man’s freedom 
fighter’’.46  
 
Moreover, while ‘terrorism’ may be socially constructed, this does not mean to say that there 
cannot be a universally agreed definition of the concept, even if we acknowledge that such a 
definition would not be the ‘truth’ but the culmination of an agreed understanding at a given 
time in a contemporary context. In the academic literature of the past four decades a general 
consensus does appear to have developed as to what the core essence of terrorism is (and it is 
one that this author concurs with) – that terrorism entails the intent to generate a wider 
psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. While such a consensus may not amount 
to being the ‘truth’, the endeavour here is to generate an understanding and conceptualization 
of terrorism around this indispensable psychological dimension.  
 
Simply abandoning terrorism as incapable of having any meaningful analytical value is 
therefore hardly tenable, and indeed would be an abdication of academic responsibility, not 
just because it would leave terrorism studies without a sufficient conceptual and theoretical 
foundation but because it would leave policymakers bereft of academic input to inform their 
own endeavours in defining the term. This is not, the author hastens to add, to be in ‘service 
to power’ but, as much as anything else, is to prevent the abuse of power. 
 
Prospects for defining terrorism? 
Having argued above for the need to enhance the analytical utility of the term ‘terrorism’, one 
may, however, have to concede the possibility that, in the course of our scrutiny, there might 
in fact be nothing qualitatively distinctive about terrorism, that from time immemorial it has 
been nothing more than a superficial and derogatory label - a delegitimising rhetorical device 
for violence that is in fact no different in essence to other forms of political violence. Some 
have suggested that the term ‘terrorism’ emerged (along with democratic systems of 
government) as a delegitimizing tool to describe the violence of those who threatened the 
status quo. Michael Blain, for example, has argued that ‘[t]he emergence of terrorism as a 
concept and political problem was associated with the development of modern liberal 
democracies’ and, using Michel Foucault’s notion of subjection, stated that ‘[t]he invention 
                                                            
44 Wight, C., ‘Theorising Terrorism: The State, Structure and History’, International Relations, 2009, 23, p.105.  
45 Op. cit. English, R., p.21 (note 4). 
46 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 42 (note 6). 
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of a discourse of terrorism was a strategic response to danger, and could be deployed through 
basic regulatory practices of subjection.’47 This ties in with contemporary ‘critical’ 
approaches that argue that ‘the accepted knowledge of the field ... functions ideologically to 
reinforce and reify existing structures of power within society, particularly that of the state’.48  
 
Seen in this way, if the term ‘terrorism’ was simply forged as a means of practicing 
subjection in order to reinforce and perpetuate prevailing power structures, then one might 
indeed argue that its perjorative nature is ‘in its genes’, that ‘moral opprobrium’49 is 
ineluctably intrinsic to the concept. If the discourse of ‘terrorism’ was generated to serve this 
purpose then how can one confound centuries of perjorative use from its inception and 
pretend that we can redeem some kind of analytical quality that it has never had? Is terrorism 
therefore, after all, violence that we simply ‘do not like’ or whose cause we disagree with? If 
it was invented as a perjorative term50 simply to discredit the violence of adversaries 
(violence which was not actually qualitatively distinctive from other forms of violence) then 
one could indeed argue that prospects for endowing terrorism with some sort of analytical 
quality are limited.  
It is this line of thinking that underpins and helps to sustain the ‘one person’s freedom fighter 
is another’s terrorist’ mantra for the same ‘practice of subjection’ takes place here: that there 
is nothing intrinsically different about terrorism, that it is merely the violence perpetrated by 
those we disagree with, that it is simply violence that is illegal or seen as illegitimate by the 
prevailing power holders. Wight reminds us that ‘[t]he history of the development of the 
modern state can be understood as a long process of appropriation and accumulation (of 
territory, peoples and resources) achieved through the use of violence, a process that had 
winners and losers.’51 He therefore sees the phenomenon of terrorism as inextricably bound 
up with the development of the state. It would indeed be strange, then, if both ‘winners and 
losers’ endorsed the status quo (and its related contemporary territorial and political 
configurations) at any given time. Naturally enough those winning the game, precisely 
because they are winning, have decided that the game has ended and have sought to 
consolidate the status quo. In this sense terrorism (at least of the ‘powerless’ or ‘power 
seekers’) can be viewed as a natural part of the ‘system’ as one of a number of opposing 
political activities, and not qualitatively different to other forms of political violence.52 The 
first possibility we have to consider, therefore, is that there is actually nothing qualitatively 
distinctive about terrorism compared with other forms of political violence.  
                                                            
47 Blain, M., ‘On the Genealogy of Terrorism’, in Staines, D., (ed.), Interrogating the War on Terror: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle (UK), 2007, pp. 50-51. 
48 Jackson, R., ‘Knowledge, power and politics in the study of political terrorism’, in Jackson, R., Breen Smyth, 
M., and Gunning, J., (eds.), Critical Terrorism Studies, Routledge, 2009, p. 67. 
49 Op. cit. Gearty, C., Terror, p. 6 (note 3). 
50 This is notwithstanding those rare examples of those who have described themselves as ‘terrorist’. (See 
Hoffman, B., Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 29). 
51 Op. cit. Wight, C., ‘Theorising Terrorism: The State, Structure and History’, p. 101 (note 44). 
52 The notion that ‘terrorism’ is merely a delegitimising tool used to discredit oppositional political violence, 
however, does not explain why more ‘positive’ labels are used for some forms of this violence (such as guerrilla 
warfare). A common distinction made is that terrorism targets civilians whereas guerrilla warfare does not 
(although, of course, guerrilla organisations have used the method of terrorism).  
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If we try and take a step further than this in theorising what terrorism is (beyond merely being 
a derogatory label) a second possibility is that it can perhaps be categorised as simply a lower 
level of political violence. Terrorism can thus be seen as simply at the lower end of the scale 
or, as many have suggested, as ‘the weapon of the weak’ (though one could argue that 
terrorism is not just carried out by the weak). This perspective again does not view terrorism 
as qualitatively different to other forms and so, as with the first perspective above, it would 
leave us with little to theorise about in relation to any distinctiveness about terrorism. 
 
Notwithstanding these two perspectives (terrorism as merely a label and/or a lower level of 
political violence), the author will endeavour to argue for a third possibility - that there is 
something distinctive about terrorism that is worth theorising about, that it is wholly 
unsatisfactory, for example, to simply define or describe terrorism as ‘you know it when you 
see it’ or, equally vaguely, that ‘[w]hat looks, smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism’.53 
Schmid and Longman, in their seminal contribution, argued that: 
 
‘... even a “minimum of theory” requires some consensus about what to theorize about 
...The search for a universalist definition of terrorism is one which scientists cannot 
give up. Without some solution to the definitional problem ... there can be no uniform 
data collection and no responsible theory building on terrorism.’54 
For many, it may seem obvious what is distinctive about terrorism – that it is a form of 
‘extranormal’ violence that targets civilians in a peacetime environment. Indeed, confronted 
with attacks like those of 9/11 and 7/7, ‘societies are clear that terrorism is an especially 
violent and unethical wrong.’55 Terrorists have deliberately targeted civilians in peacetime 
environments and it is this that makes terrorism so shocking and extranormal. As Laqueur 
once wrote, a characteristic feature of terrorism is ‘the violation of established norms.’56  
Yet, states have themselves, of course, also targeted civilians, although in the context of war 
these are now called ‘war crimes’. From an International Humanitarian Law perspective 
Koechler proposed ‘a comprehensive or unified approach’ to attacks on civilians both in 
peace and war time: 
 
‘In a universal and at the same time unified system of norms – ideally to be created as 
an extension of existing legal instruments -, there should be corresponding sets of 
rules (a) penalizing deliberate attacks on civilians or civilian infrastructure in wartime 
(as covered by the Geneva Conventions), and (b) penalizing deliberate attacks on 
civilians in peacetime (covered by the 12 so far anti-terrorist conventions).’57 
                                                            
53 Jeremy Greenstock, (former) British Ambassador to the United Nations, in op. cit. Schmid, A., ‘Terrorism – 
The Definitional Problem’, p. 375 (note 1). 
54 Schmid, A., and Longman, A., Political Terrorism, Transaction Books, Third Edition, 2008, p. 3. 
55 Gearty, C. (ed.), Terrorism, Dartmouth Publishing, 1996, p. xi. 
56 Laqueur, W., Terrorism, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1977, p. 3. 
57 Koechler, H., cited in Santos, S., ‘Terrorism: Toward a Legal Definition’, The Manila Times, October 5th 
2002, available at: http://www.i-p-o.org/Manila-Times1.htm (accessed November 6th 2013). 
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One inclination then has been to conceptualize terrorism within the context of the broader 
framework of international norms to do with the protection of the ‘innocent’, ‘civilians’ or 
‘non-combatants’ and hence the proposal that terrorism be viewed as the peacetime 
equivalent of a war-crime. States are obliged to comply with these norms and where they 
haven’t they suffer the indignation of the international community. In other words there is 
generally a compliance, or at least a pretence of compliance, with these norms of 
international behaviour whereas those carrying out acts of terrorism deliberately flout them, 
and that this is what makes terrorism different. From a policymaking perspective, it is 
understandable, and perhaps even logical, that the application of these norms across the board 
should inform a definition of terrorism – that what marks acts of political violence out as 
terrorism is the deliberate targeting of civilians or non-combatants.  
Yet, as the author will go on to argue, anybody can be a victim of terrorism and this includes 
non-civilians and combatants. While civilian or non-combatant targeting may be a frequent or 
even predominant feature of terrorism it is not definitional of the concept, and a general 
definition of terrorism must apply to all cases. What, then, is peculiar to all cases of terrorism 
and how can this be captured in a definition? 
 
The Essence of Terrorism 
 
Before proposing three key assumptions when approaching the definition of terrorism it is 
worth reiterating what the author views as indispensable to the phenomenon: that the essence 
of terrorism lies in the intent or purpose behind the act of violence rather than in the act 
itself, namely to generate a wider psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. The 
definition of terrorism ultimately proposed here is therefore a purpose-based one.58 The idea 
that the intent or the purpose behind the act lies at the heart of terrorism is captured in 
Schmid’s observation:  
 
‘There is, in our view, a solid conceptual core to terrorism, differentiating from 
ordinary violence. It consists in the calculated production of a state of extreme fear of 
injury and death and, secondarily, the exploitation of this emotional reaction to 
manipulate behaviour.’59 
What is therefore key to a definition of terrorism is that the intent behind the act of violence, 
or the threatened act of violence, ‘is psychological and symbolic, not material’.60 Hoffman 
also argued that terrorism entails: 
 
‘the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change .... Terrorism is specifically designed to 
have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of 
                                                            
58 See op. cit. Schmid, A., and Longman, A., p. 50 for purpose-based typologies of terrorism (note 54). 
59 Ibid. pp. 20-21. 
60 An ‘American critic’ cited in op. cit. Schmid, A., and Longman, A., Political Terrorism, p. 8 (note 54). 
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the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 
“target audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire 
country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general.’61  
 
Central to terrorism, therefore, is the ‘‘organized and systematic attempt to create fear’... that 
aims at attaining specific political ends (motivation) through the creation of fear, and not 
through the mere act of violence.’62 As Jenkins also argued: ‘[f]ear is the intended effect, not 
the byproduct, of terrorism.’63 Terrorism is therefore primarily concerned with generating a 
psychological impact over and above any tangible or military gain.64 It is this intent behind 
the act of violence that determines whether or not it is an act of terrorism. According to 
Gearty ‘[a] pure terrorist act results in everyone recoiling in horror, with the words ‘it could 
have been me’ etched on their mind’.65 
 
Three preliminary assumptions when approaching the definition of 
terrorism 
1) There is no such thing as an act of violence that is in and of itself inherently 
terrorist.  
 
Terrorism’s physical manifestation can vary from the use of incendiary devices, to gun 
attacks, to a variety of different types of bomb attacks (including suicide bomb attacks), to 
‘mass casualty’ attacks on the scale of 9/11 and so on. Therefore the physical part of 
terrorism can be seen as consisting of a range of different methods. The World Incidents 
Tracking System, for example, codes ‘terrorist incidents’ as the following: ‘armed attack, 
arson/firebombing, assassination, assault, barricade/hostage, bombing, CBRN, crime, 
firebombing, hijacking, hoax, kidnapping, near miss/non-attack, other, theft, unknown, and 
vandalism.’66 
None of these acts of violence, however, even those that might be commonly associated with 
terrorism (such as bombings and hijackings), are in and of themselves inherently terrorist 
acts. It is only when one adds layers of meaning to the physical act that one can then 
determine whether or not such an act can be labelled terrorism. For example, a shooting can 
be an act of crime, terrorism or warfare. But once layers of meaning have been endowed upon 
the act then we can broadly refer to the method of terrorism as distinct from the different 
                                                            
61 Hoffman, B.,  Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 1998, pp. 43-4. 
62 European Commission Sixth Framework Programme Project, ‘Defining Terrorism’, p. 57 (note 1). 
63 Jenkins, B., cited in op. cit. Schmid, A., and Longman, A., Political Terrorism, p. 36 (note 54). 
64 A distinction should be made, however, between the purpose of a specific act and the broader political goal or 
motive. The former may be successfully achieved but the latter may not (in fact very rarely is). 
65 Op. cit. Gearty, C., Terror, p. 9 (note 3). Although, as argued above, the victims or the ‘target group’ of 
terrorism should not by definition be restricted to civilians or non-combatants, such targets can no doubt elicit a 
more shocking and greater psychological impact. 
66 See ‘National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information’, US Department of State, available 
at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2008/122452.htm (accessed November 6th 2013). 
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methods or manifestations of the violence itself. These layers of meaning render terrorism as 
not just being about violence or the threat of violence and is why any definition that focuses 
on the particular acts of violence themselves as integral to terrorism misses the point when it 
comes to establishing the meaning of the concept.  
The use of examples might help to illustrate the point. A suicide bomb self-detonated in a 
crowded market place might inescapably be labelled an act of terrorism without any further 
thought – that it ‘looks’ and ‘smells’ like terrorism.67 In theory, however, such an act is still 
possible without a political motive, thus rendering the act as something other than terrorism. 
Hypothetically, a disgruntled individual may have carried out the act in revenge against their 
work place (or former work place) or even against a local community.  
A car bomb might also be ineluctably associated with terrorism. One exploded in Kent in the 
United Kingdom in March 2010 and a pregnant woman was badly injured. The incident may 
have looked like an act of terrorism – a very similar act, for example, to the car bombs that 
the IRA commonly used to generate a psychological impact and to draw attention to its 
political cause. The difference is that the Kent car bomb was planted by the victim’s husband 
who was said to be suffering from post-traumatic stress. In other words, even an act of 
violence that may be commonly seen as synonymous with terrorism (the car bomb) is not 
necessarily an act of terrorism unless it is imbued with meaning (ie. a political motive and 
designed to have a psychological impact beyond the immediate victim[s]). 
Acts of terrorism may entail shooting attacks, perhaps best exemplified by the Al Shabaab 
attack in Nairobi in September 2013, or the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, or by Irish 
Republican sniper attacks. Again, not all cases of shootings in civilian environments are 
terrorist. Although Raoul Moat ‘terrorised’ his community in July 2010 in Northumberland in 
the UK after going on the run, his shootings were not acts of terrorism because they lacked a 
political goal. The same can be said of the actions of a sacked police officer, Rolando 
Mendoza, in Manila in the Philippines who seized control of a bus and demanded to be 
reinstated (with a subsequent death toll of eight after a shoot-out with the authorities). In 
other words it is wholly inadequate to describe terrorism as ‘you know it when you see it’ or 
‘[w]hat looks, smells and kills like terrorism is terrorism’.68  
What about the archetypal acts of terrorism of recent times – how, for example, can one not 
immediately recognise the attacks of 9/11 as acts of terrorism? Again, taken in isolation, each 
act of violence on 9/11 might not have been an act of terrorism. Any such act might have 
been carried out by a psychologically disturbed individual, or by those seeking a ransom 
where crew and passenger resistance may have led to an aircraft crashing, or, considered in 
isolation, the first crash could have been a tragic accident. Indeed, after this first incident it 
was by no means clear at that stage that we were witnessing an act of terrorism. In the case of 
the London bombings of 2007 there were some early indications that an electrical fault might 
have been the cause. The point is that even in cases of what might subsequently be called 
                                                            
67 Jeremy Greenstock, (former) British Ambassador to the United Nations, in op. cit. Schmid, A., ‘Terrorism – 
The Definitional Problem’, p. 375 (note 1). 
68 Ibid. 
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archetypal acts of terrorism conclusions as to whether they could be classified as acts of 
terrorism could not be made immediately. Of course, once layers of meaning were added then 
it could be confirmed that these were indeed acts of terrorism – that these were deliberate and 
simultaneous attacks, that they were politically motivated, and that they aimed to generate a 
massive psychological impact amongst a much broader group than the victims.  
So, in summary, the first assumption proposed that informs our discussion as to what 
terrorism is, is that there is no such thing as an act of violence that can in and of itself 
inherently be described as an act of terrorism. Whatever the type of violence chosen ‘the 
primary intent [of terrorism] … is to produce fear and alarm that may serve a variety of 
purposes’.69 The essence of terrorism lies in the intent behind the act of violence, and the 
‘primary intent’ of terrorism is to spread fear beyond the immediate victims. If it is not 
intended to have this wider psychological impact then it is not terrorism. 
 
Implication 
The implication of this first assumption is that any lists of terrorist ‘acts’ or of the physical 
manifestations of terrorism do not bring us any closer to capturing what terrorism is. Any 
conjecture, therefore, as to which of the wide range of types of violent acts should constitute 
terrorism is unnecessary. For example, Weinberg et al need not have concerned themselves 
with this when they argued that ‘unless we are willing to label as terrorism a very wide range 
of violent activities, we may be better off finding another governing concept or looking 
elsewhere for a definition’70 - for it is the purpose of, and intent behind, the act of violence 
(and not the type of act itself) that is integral to the phenomenon and determines whether or 
not it can be regarded as an act of terrorism.  
One could also suggest, therefore, that the United Nations approach of countering certain acts 
as ‘terrorist acts’ does not assist us in conceptualizing terrorism (though defining terrorism 
was not its primary intention when drafting its Conventions). Nor do such references as 
‘Hijacking may be described as a special type of terrorism’71 - this is because there can, as in 
the case of other forms of ‘terrorist’ violence, be non-terrorist hijackings.72 
 
When focusing on a definition of terrorism, any list of types of violence that are labelled 
‘terrorist acts’ are not then going to be particularly useful in helping us to conceptualize 
terrorism or in grasping what the essence of terrorism is. As such, the UN and the EU’s 
approach of identifying and addressing ‘a wide spectrum of terrorist acts’, or French law that 
                                                            
69 Jenkins, B., ‘The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems’, the RAND Corporation, December 1980, p. 2, 
available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2006/P6563.pdf (accessed November 6th 2013). 
70 Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, ‘The Challenges of Conceptualizing 
Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 16, Winter 2004, No. 4, p. 787. 
71 Dugard, J., ‘International Terrorism: Problems of Definition’, International Affairs, Volume 50, No. 1, 
January 1974, p. 71. 
72 For example, in theory, hijackings can be carried out for non-political reasons, such as for ransom demands. 
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specifically names and describes the acts that constitute terrorism73, or indeed any such 
lists74, while from a legal perspective may be useful, again serve only to deviate us from this, 
because terrorism is not inherent to any particular act or type of violence. This perhaps comes 
as something of a relief because it means that, in the course of our conceptual deliberations, 
we do not then have to address the emergence of new and different types of acts of violence 
that may develop along with advances in technology. As Tiefenberg observes, ‘as new forms 
of technology are created, new forms of terrorist acts are likely to develop’ though his 
suggestion (from a legal perspective) that ‘this problem might be countered by enacting an 
extensive list of specific crimes of terrorism’ would again not bring us any closer to capturing 
what terrorism is.75 76 
 
2) Terrorism is a particular method used by a wide variety of actors and so perpetrator 
or cause based definitions (beyond political motive) are unhelpful  
 
The notion of terrorism as a method is certainly not new – in fact it was ‘formulated’ as a 
‘method of combat’ in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences in 1936.77 When we refer to 
the ‘method’ of terrorism we are not then alluding to the various types of violence used (ie. 
the physical manifestation of terrorism), but to the purpose or intent behind the act of 
violence, which is to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. 
Terrorism, with this indispensable psychological dimension, is a particular method of 
violence that has been used by a wide variety of actors and requires more than just an act of 
violence or the threat of violence. A definition does not need to refer to the perpetrator or the 
cause (other than being political) but it does need to establish the intent behind that act of 
violence, namely to ‘terrorise’ (and/or to motivate/mobilise) a wider population. 
 
Implications 
                                                            
73 Article 421-1 of the French Criminal Code lists the following acts as terrorist acts: ‘Attempted murder, 
assault, kidnapping, hostage-taking on airplanes, ships, all means of transport, theft, extortion, destructions, and 
crimes committed during group combat, the production or ownership of weapons of destruction and explosives 
including the production, sale, import and export of explosives, the acquisition, ownership, transport of illegal 
explosive substances, the production, ownership, storage, or acquisition of biological or chemical weapons, and 
money laundering.’ (cited in Tiefenbrun, S., ‘A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism’, ILSA 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 9 (2003), No. 2, p. 71). 
74 Bassiouni lists fourteen specific acts of terrorism which are: ‘aggression, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, apartheid, unlawful human experimentation; torture, slavery and slave-related practices; 
piracy, and unlawful acts against the safety of maritime  navigation; kidnapping of diplomats and other 
internationally protected persons; taking civilian hostages; serious environmental damage; or serious violation 
of fundamental human rights.’ (cited in op. cit. Tiefenbrun, S., ‘A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of 
Terrorism’, p. 393, note 73). 
75 Op. cit. Tiefenbrun, S., ‘A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism’, p. 69 (note 73). 
76 While it is not the particular act of violence itself that determines whether or not that act is terrorism, but the 
intent and purpose behind it, the seriousness of the act is, however, of relevance to the conceptual discussion. 
For example, an issue of contention is how serious an act of violence must be to be considered an act of 
terrorism. 
77 Op. cit. Schmid and Longman Schmid, A., and Longman, A., Political Terrorism, p. 13 (note 54). 
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The utility of viewing terrorism as a method (or a tactic) is that it allows us to implicitly 
acknowledge that terrorism is not particular to any type of actor for it has been used by a 
wide variety of actors, not just terrorist organisations. An actor-free definition of terrorism 
means that no type of perpetrator of terrorism is excluded, be they states, social movements, 
guerrilla groups, terrorist groups and so on. In this context, a clearer distinction in terrorism 
studies ‘between ‘terrorist groups’ and groups that deploy terrorism as one of many insurgent 
and political strategies’ is a worthy one to make.78  As Weinberg rightly observed the notion 
that ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ is confusing the goal with the 
activity.79 So too, therefore, does the view (apparently articulated by the UN Secretary-
General in March 1987 in relation to the PLO and SWAPO) that ‘sometimes it is difficult to 
tell where terrorism ends and the struggle for self-determination begins.’80 
 
Schmid, in 1983, suggested that ‘terrorism is a method of combat in which random or 
symbolic victims become targets of violence …’ and aptly makes no reference as to who 
carries out this ‘method of combat’81, and Cooper rightly argues that we ‘can no longer afford 
the fiction that one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Fighting for freedom may 
well be his or her purpose, but if the mission is undertaken through the employment of 
terrorist means, a terrorist he or she must remain’82. Crenshaw also makes the point that: ‘the 
identity of the actor [whether state or non-state] does not matter to the specification of the 
method’.83 
It is also why many observers miss the point when they pose such questions as: ‘where to 
draw the line between the quest for nationalist identity and an act of terrorism ...?’84 or when 
Yasir Arafat declared that: 
 
‘The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist … lies in the reason for 
which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and 
liberation of his land from the invaders, the settlers and the colonialists, cannot 
possibly be called a terrorist ....’.85 
 
The difference between the terrorist and the non-terrorist does not lie in the reason for which 
one fights, as Arafat proclaimed. Otherwise we are conceding that terrorism really is 
                                                            
78 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 28 (note 6). 
79 Weinberg, Leonard, 2005. Global Terrorism, A Beginner’s Guide, Oneworld, p. 2.  
80 Romanov, V., ‘The United Nations and the Problem of Combatting International Terrorism’, Terrorism and 
Political Violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 2, Autumn 1990, No. 3, p. 295. 
81 Schmid, A. (1983). Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature. 
New Brunswick: Transaction, p. 111. 
82 Cooper (2001, p. 887), cited in Griset, P., and Mahan, S., Terrorism in Perspective, Sage, Thousand Oaks 
(California) and London, 2003, p. 59, available at: 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YpmZ76zRW2oC&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=defining+terrorism
&ots=mN6SlK4htr&sig=YT9v2D6lMm8eKpHIcszBCfU9mUM#v=onepage&q=defining%20terrorism&f=false 
(accessed November 6th 2013). 
83 Op. cit. Crenshaw, M., Explaining Terrorism, Causes, Processes and Consequences, p. 207 (note 8). 
84 Op. cit. Acharya, U., ‘War on Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terrorism’, p. 656 (note 13). 
85 Arafat, Y., cited in op. cit. Hoffman, B.,  Inside Terrorism, p. 26 (note 61). 
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‘violence that we don’t like’ (or whose cause we disagree with) and that there is in fact 
nothing qualitatively distinctive about terrorism compared with other forms of political 
violence. In the course of endeavours to define terrorism in the aftermath of the 1972 Munich 
Olympics attack by the Palestinian Black September group, Syria argued that ‘the 
international community is under legal and moral obligation to promote the struggle for 
liberation and to resist any attempt to depict this struggle as synonymous with terrorism and 
illegitimate violence.’86 Again, any attempt to either instinctively deny the use of terrorism 
because of the ‘worthiness’ of the cause, or indeed, conversely, to conflate terrorism with 
certain causes that one finds unpalatable, obfuscates endeavours to elevate terrorism as an 
analytical concept.  
 
Yet, such associations (and non-associations) have proved remarkably (and unhelpfully) 
resilient. Pillar has also rightly argued that terrorism is something that ‘people (or groups, or 
states) do, rather than who they are or what they are trying to achieve’ (author’s italics)87. 
Terrorism, as a method, should be ‘defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the 
perpetrators or the nature of their cause.’88 
 
There may be ideologies that have been interpreted, adapted or distorted to explicitly justify 
the use of terrorism and where terrorism may then become ideologically embedded. In this 
sense one might indeed call them ‘terrorist ideologies’ where the use of terrorism is intrinsic 
to the doctrine. It could be argued that this is the case with Al Qaeda and the notion of 
terrorism and political violence as a religious duty, or indeed with the tradition of ‘physical 
force’ Irish republicanism – for example Patrick Pearse’s proclamations of the notion of self-
sacrificial acts as being a compelling symbol of republican ideology. But there are, of course, 
many nationalist, religious, left wing, right wing, and single issue (anti-abortion, animal 
rights, environmental) ideologies that are not inherently violent though terrorism has often 
been employed in their name. When conceptualizing terrorism, therefore, there is no one 
doctrine, violent or otherwise, that can claim ownership of terrorism - it is a method of 
violence that has at some time or other been perpetrated in the cause of doctrines within all of 
these categories. 
What this way of viewing terrorism enables us to do is to more accurately describe the actors 
that have often been labelled ‘terrorist groups’. For example, the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) can more clearly be seen as a guerrilla group that has used 
terrorist tactics. Hamas can be seen as a social and political movement that has also used the 
method of terrorism. There have been those who claim to be acting on behalf of animal rights 
                                                            
86 Cited in Hoffman. B., ‘Defining Terrorism’, in Howard, R. And Sawyer, R., (eds.), Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and Interpretations, McGraw-Hill, 
2002, p. 16. 
87 Pillar, P., ‘The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism’, in op. cit. Howard, R. And Sawyer, R., 
(eds.), Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Understanding the New Security Environment, Readings and 
Interpretations, p. 28 (note 86). 
88 Op. cit. Jenkins, ‘The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems’, pp. 2-3 (note 69). 
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that have on occasion used terrorist tactics, although one could argue that most of what 
animal rights ‘extremists’ do is not ‘terroristic’.89  
In fact, what becomes apparent is that it is rarely the case that there are what one might call 
‘pure’ ‘terrorist organisations’. Crenshaw concurs that it is very unusual for terrorism to be 
used exclusively as a form of struggle, citing the Abu Nidal as one of the few possible 
examples.90 The so-called Fighting Communist Organisations (FCOs) of the 1970s and 80s 
(such as the Red Army Faction, Direct Action, The Red Brigades and November 17) could 
arguably be seen as other instances. But in general terrorism forms but one part of the 
political activity of those who carry it out, and in some cases this other activity includes other 
forms of political violence. Guerrilla movements, such as FARC or the defeated Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), used traditional guerrilla tactics (such as attacking state 
forces in the open) as well as acts of terrorism. Crenshaw lists a number of what she calls 
‘internal wars’ (post WW2) that have been ‘accompanied by terrorism’ including the 
‘Phillipines, Cyprus, Malaya, Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Vietnam, [and] Latin 
America’. 91  
 
 
3) Acts of terrorism are not just carried out against civilians or non-combatants.  
 
A third assumption that the author makes when approaching the definition of terrorism is 
that, while acts of terrorism are very often (even predominantly) carried out indiscriminately 
or against civilian or non-combatant targets, civilian or non-combatant targeting should not 
be definitional of terrorism.92 Indeed, Narodnaya Volya, often cited as one of the most well-
known of terrorist antecedents, described its activity as ‘the destruction of the most harmful 
persons in the government’ (rather than civilians per se).93 Terrorism can entail violence 
against ‘any person’, as stated in the United Nations’ draft comprehensive convention, 
despite the objections of those who argue for the centrality of civilian or non-combatant 
targets in the definition.94 In 1978 Crenshaw also argued that although the victims of 
terrorism are usually civilian ‘they may include the military or the police’.95  
A brief survey of Easson and Schmid’s 250 definitions of terrorism appears to endorse the 
view that terrorism is not just carried out against civilians or non-combatants. In fact, most of 
the definitions in their compilation do not make explicit reference to civilians or non-
                                                            
89 As argued by Schmid, A., (personal communication). 
90 Op. cit. Crenshaw, M., Explaining Terrorism, Causes, Processes and Consequences, p. 4 (note 8). 
91 Crenshaw, M., ‘The concept of revolutionary terrorism’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution (pre 1986), 
Volume 16, No. 3, September 1972, p. 395. 
92 For a discussion on this see also Held, V., ‘Terrorism and War’, The Journal of Ethics, 8, 2004. 
93 Narodnaya Volya, cited in op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 99 
(note 6). 
94 See Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 55 (note 6). 
95 Crenshaw, M., quoted in op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 118 
(note 6). 
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combatants as being victims (approximately 70 of the 250 make reference to ‘civilian’, ‘non-
combatant’ or ‘innocent’ victims, with about half of these appearing in post-9/11 definitions). 
There are others that use more general terms, such as ‘targeting a population’ or a ‘group’, 
and there are a few that emphasise the arbritrariness and/or indiscriminate nature of terrorist 
acts.96 
 
Schmid argues that the ‘very core of terrorism’ is that ‘[t]he direct victim of violence (or 
threat thereof) is different from the ultimate target (audience)’, and that ‘[f]or this reason 
anyone can, in principle, become a victim of terrorism’ (italics added).97 Yet, in the same 
piece Schmid conversely argued that: 
 
‘If those opposing terrorism want to maintain the moral high ground, they will have to 
observe this distinction between the unarmed civilian population and regular or 
irregular armed forces. However, they should only label as ‘terrorism’ attacks that 
deliberately target civilians and non-combatants.’98 
This narrower approach, as we have argued earlier, may, in keeping with international norms, 
be borne of a general desire to protect civilians and ‘protected persons’ from all forms of 
political conflict. Contrary to the purpose-based approach to the definition of terrorism 
proposed in this article, this represents a moral victim-based approach. If we agree, however, 
that the essence of terrorism lies in its primary intent to generate a psychological impact 
beyond the immediate victims then, based on this, terrorism can be carried out against both 
non-combatant and combatant targets. It is then another question as to which forms of 
terrorism (based on target differentiation) should be of more concern to policymakers than 
others. Were not, for example, many of the ‘combatant’ targets of the IRA victims of 
terrorism, providing the aim was to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate 
casualties? Terrorism can be carried out against anyone, providing the victims or object of 
attack serve sufficiently as ‘message generators’ to a wider group or audience. 
In arguing that acts of terrorism can take place against combatants in war, one might consider 
the example of the ‘rogue’ Afghan soldiers who have turned on NATO troops. If this is a 
concerted strategy of intimidation against the wider NATO troop body then these can 
certainly be classified as acts of terrorism. Yet, civilians were not targeted, nor, arguably, did 
they take place in a peacetime environment. Thus, acts of terrorism are possible within war 
providing the psychological impact is the primary objective over the physical one.99 
                                                            
96 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (note 6). 
97 Ibid. p. 80. Though Schmid does suggest (p. 81) that the army could be a target audience and hence be a 
victim of terrorism in this sense, rather than being a direct victim. 
98 Ibid. p. 81. 
99 One of the challenges of arguing that anyone (including combatants) can be a victim of terrorism (providing 
wider psychological impact is the primary purpose) is that surely all acts of political violence (including acts of 
warfare) are intended to have some degree of psychological impact so what, therefore, is the difference between 
terrorism and, for example, conventional acts of warfare? This author would argue that for it to be terrorism 
psychological impact has to be the primary motivation whereas with war it tends to be physical/tangible gain 
through damage to an adversary’s war effort or the acquisition/retention of territory. This then prompts us to 
consider a further challenge – what then is the difference between terrorism and psychological warfare? Here, I 
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The case of the ‘rogue shootings’ or ‘green on blue’ attacks in Afghanistan merit closer 
scrutiny. While it has been argued that most of the attacks have ‘nothing to do with the 
Taliban’ and that they tend to be ‘rooted in a mixture of personal arguments and cultural 
misunderstandings’ at least some of the attacks have been linked to the Taliban.100 Indeed, the 
Nato Secretary-General argued that the Taliban ‘had "played out a strategy" to undermine 
confidence in the Afghan security forces’.101 It was widely reported that the green on blue 
attacks had a wider and negative impact on NATO troop morale – in other words the acts of 
violence have generated a wider psychological impact beyond the immediate victims. 
Hypothetically, if this psychological impact was the primary purpose of the attacks, then one 
could describe them as acts of terrorism.102 
If the main purpose of the acts of violence carried out by the resistance movements of the 
second world war (in opposition to nazi rule) was to generate a psychological impact beyond 
the immediate victims then such acts could also be classified as acts of terrorism against 
military targets in the context of war, though again what constitutes a ‘war environment’ is 
debatable. Terrorism, then, is about the use of violence or the credible threat of violence in 
order to generate a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims, whether they are 
civilian (or non-combatant) or not, or whether one sympathises with the cause or not. 
Implications 
 
One implication of this third assumption is that the phenomenon cannot then be 
conceptualized as the peacetime equivalent of a war crime. This is because acts of terrorism 
can then take place within war against combatants. In any case, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, such an ‘equivalence’ is also questioned by the fact that spreading fear 
beyond the immediate victims is not a necessary pre-requisite for something to be called a 
‘war crime’ whereas it is for an act of terrorism. Thus, while it is possible to argue that the 
physical manifestation of those acts of terrorism that target civilians in peacetime may deem 
them to be the peacetime equivalent of war crimes,103 this overlooks the psychological 
dimension that is indispensable to terrorism.   
A second implication of viewing terrorism as not just targeting civilians or non-combatants is 
the extent to which terrorism can then be conceptualized as an ‘extranormal’ form of political 
violence (however one defines ‘extranormal’). In one of the earlier theoretical contributions 
                                                            
would suggest that it is a matter of scale. Terrorism and state terror, in my view, are separate phenomena (see 
Richards, Conceptualizing Terrorism (forthcoming)), with the latter being of a much larger scale than the 
former. It is therefore state terror (rather than terrorism) that I believe is more akin to psychological warfare 
(though one could argue that terrorism is a lower form of it). 
100 The Economist, ‘Green on Blue blues’, September 1st 2012, available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21561943 (accessed November 6th 2013). 
101 BBC News online, ‘Afghan policeman kills three British soldiers’, July 2nd 2012, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18670175 (accessed November 6th 2013). 
102 Indeed the outcome was to undermine attempts to train the Afghan forces with the US apparently suspending 
its training of new recruits to the Afghan police force (BBC News online, ‘Afghanistan ‘rogue’ attack: Four US 
soldiers killed’, September 16th 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-19614911 (accessed 
November 6th 2013). 
103 Though this wouldn’t be the case if one included acts of violence against property in a definition of terrorism. 
22 
 
to the study of terrorism Thornton described the phenomenon as ‘a symbolic act designed to 
influence political behaviour by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence’ 
and that ‘terror lies beyond the norms of violent political agitation that are accepted by a 
given society’.104 Crenshaw concurs with the view that ‘terrorism differs from other 
instruments of violence in its “extranormality”’,105 while Wardlaw also argued that ‘It is the 
extranormal nature of the use of terror that distinguishes it from other forms of political 
violence.’106 Schmid also writes of the terrorists’ ‘decidedly extra-normal violence’.107 
The argument that acts of violence can still be terrorism if combatants are targeted, and that, 
further, some such acts may even be legal in the context of war (perhaps as a ‘lower’ form of 
psychological warfare), implies that some acts of terrorism are more ‘extranormal’ than 
others. Some forms may be deemed extremely extranormal – such as those that deliberately 
target civilians, and, in particular, children, such as the Beslan school massacre of 2004 - in 
this case in contravention of ‘the powerful norm that non-majority age persons lack 
intellectual maturity and cannot be held accountable for political policies’.108 It is also the 
case, however, that some acts of terrorism (such as those against combatants in the context of 
war, or against the military of oppressive states) may not in fact be seen as extranormal at all. 
 
Terrorism can therefore take the form of targeting both non-combatants (however defined) 
and combatants and definitions of the phenomenon should reflect this. And such definitions 
should have sufficient scope for the possibility that some acts of terrorism are more 
‘shocking’ or more ‘extranormal’ than others, and indeed, that some may actually elicit one’s 
sympathy rather than condemnation depending on one’s perspective. If the international 
community is understandably more concerned with acts of terrorism that target civilians than 
those that do not then it should be argued that this is but one form of terrorism that should 
receive priority in terms of response, rather than determining that civilian or non-combatant 
targeting be definitional of terrorism. 
An additional related implication, then, is that there may be some terrorisms that one 
sympathises with. This is certainly not a new proposition but it does underpin a particular 
dilemma that has been apparent in the international community’s response to terrorism – that 
is the paradoxical approach of at times explicitly declaring a zero-tolerance approach to 
terrorism in all of ‘its forms and manifestations’ and yet simultaneously exhibiting an implicit 
sympathy for some terrorisms - for example, those against oppressive regimes and that refrain 
from targeting civilians or non-combatants.109 What about, for instance, acts of terrorism that 
do not target civilians (or non-combatants) but are carried out in defence or pursuit of 
‘freedoms, rights and liberties … [that] … serve as the basis of the Charter of Fundamental 
                                                            
104 Thornton, T., ‘Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation’, in Eckstein, H., (ed.), Internal War, Collier-
Macmillan, Toronto, 1964, p. 73-76. 
105 Op. cit. Crenshaw, ‘The concept of revolutionary terrorism’, p. 384 (note 91). 
106 Wardlaw, G., Political Terrorism, Cambridge University Press, 1990, Chapter 1: The Problem of Defining 
Terrorism, p. 10. 
107 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 19 (note 6). 
108 Kelly, R., ‘Is Terrorism Always Wrong?’, Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 1 (2007), Issue 1, p. 19, 
available at: http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/articles/issues/PTv1i1.pdf (accessed November 6th 2013). 
109 See, for example, discussion in Op. cit. Carlile, A., The Definition of Terrorism (note 37). 
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Rights of the European Union’? 110 Saul, for example, considers that the international 
community might regard ‘some terrorist-type violence as “illegal but justifiable” … where it 
was committed in the “collective defence of human rights”’.111  
In his deliberations over the definition of terrorism Lord Carlile noted that: 
‘Many people have represented to me that it should not be an offence to plot and 
perpetrate terrorism against oppressive regimes which act in breach of their 
international obligations, subject to the proviso that civilians and noncombatants are 
not deliberately targeted or foreseen as victims.’112 
 
While zero tolerance approaches against terrorism ‘whoever the perpetrator’, and ‘whatever 
the motive’113 might helpfully move us away from perpetrator or cause based conceptions of 
terrorism, they do not acknowledge that there are some ‘terrorisms’ that one might agree 
with. Would the United Kingdom and the United States, for example, object if acts of 
terrorism were carried out against troops loyal to the Assad regime in Syria, or against pro-
regime militias such as the notorious Shabiha? Wasn’t some of the activity of the Kosovan 
Liberation Army, from the ‘Western’ perspective, an example of ‘good terrorism’? The KLA 
targeted Serbian military and police, often in its early days relying on hit and run targets that 
were designed to have a wider psychological impact by ‘[denting] the self-confidence and 
prestige of the Serbian Military’, and [breaking] the myth of their invincibility.’114 Nor 
should one use more ‘positive’ labels, like ‘freedom fighting’, for the same activity – freedom 
fighting refers to a goal whereas terrorism is an activity – and so, in this author’s view, we 
should refute the view that ‘‘freedom fighters’ [inverted commas added] who attack only 
combatants are not terrorists.’115 To do so simply further entrenches terrorism as a derogatory 
label at the expense of analytical utility.  
 
In other words a comprehensive (and more honest) definition of terrorism needs to 
incorporate the possibility of terrorism that one might sympathise with or even endorse as 
well as ‘bad terrorism’ and international approaches to the phenomenon arguably should 
reflect this. 116 It is then, another question as to which forms of terrorism should merit more 
urgent response (ie. that which targets civilians or non-combatants). Any moral repugnance 
against some particularly brutal forms of the phenomenon should not deviate us from 
                                                            
110 Op. cit. European Commission Sixth Framework Programme Project, ‘Defining Terrorism’, p. 89 (note 38). 
111 Saul, B., ‘Defining Terrorism to Protect Human Rights’, in Staines, D., (ed.), Interrogating the War on 
Terror: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle (UK), 2007, p. 208. 
112 Op. cit. Carlile, A., The Definition of Terrorism (note 37). 
113 Romanov, V., ‘The United Nations and the Problem of Combatting International Terrorism’, Terrorism and 
Political Violence’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 2, Autumn 1990, No. 3. p.297. 
114 Mulaj, K., ‘Resisting an Oppressive Regime: The Case of Kosovo Liberation Army’, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, Volume 31, No. 12, 2008, p. 1111. 
115 Enders, cited in op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 20 (note 6). 
116 The activities of the resistance movements (to nazi rule) in World War Two are often cited as examples. 
Schmid uses the hypothetical example where the seizure of the family of a genocidal dictator might be 
undertaken in order to prevent further genocide. Interestingly, this last example even allows for ‘good terrorism’ 
against civilians as a ‘lesser evil’ (depending upon how one defines civilians). (op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 95 [note 6]).  
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including the less contemptible (or even noble) forms from a general definition of the concept 
as a whole. For example, even if the French resistance did not target civilians when they 
carried out acts of violence against an oppressive and occupying (nazi) regime, they 
nevertheless, subject to the necessary criteria (in particular the intent to generate a 
psychological impact beyond the immediate victims), still carried out acts of terrorism. It is 
entirely understandable, if regrettable, that in the real world of domestic and international 
politics ‘terrorism’ is used selectively given its perjorative connotation in practice, and this is 
one of the fundamental challenges for more objective academic endeavours in 
conceptualizing terrorism (and a formidable barrier to being heard). 
 
Conclusion: defining terrorism and the empirical problem of proving 
intent 
If we are endeavouring to define terrorism, and if we argue that there is something different 
about terrorism that is common to all acts of terrorism (and that this is not civilian targeting 
or a peacetime environment, or indeed extranormal violence), then what is qualitatively 
distinctive about all forms of the phenomenon? While being open to the possibility that, as 
we have considered above, there may be nothing particular or intrinsic about it, the author 
ultimately concludes that what makes terrorism different to other forms of political violence 
is its primary purpose of generating a wider psychological impact beyond the immediate 
victims or object of attack.117 While warfare in general or state terror may at times have a 
similar purpose this is the sine qua non of terrorism. Primoratz makes the distinction clear: 
‘all uses of political violence effect some degree of fear’, but in ‘terrorism proper, the causing 
of fear and coercion through fear is the objective’.118 How then should we ultimately define 
the phenomenon? It has been said that ‘[t]he art of making a good definition is to include as 
few elements as possible but also as many as necessary’.119 Hence my definition is limited to 
simply this: terrorism is the use of violence or the threat of violence with the primary purpose 
of generating a psychological impact beyond the immediate victims or object of attack for a 
political motive. This, in my view is common to all acts of terrorism. If the primary aim is 
not to generate this wider psychological impact then it is not terrorism.  
It might be argued that this definition is short of some key features of terrorism that are often 
included in the definitions of others. Yet, in the context of what I have argued above, many of 
these, such as civilian/non-combatant targeting, the use of ‘extranormal’ violence, or 
terrorism as illegitimate violence, cannot be considered to be definitional of terrorism. There 
may therefore be some merit in describing terrorism over and above defining it.120 This 
would allow us to draw attention to features of terrorism that ‘often’ or ‘usually’ apply but 
                                                            
117 See note 99 in relation to a further discussion on the difference between terrorism and psychological warfare. 
The author suggests that state terror, rather than terrorism, is more akin to psychological warfare. 
118 Primoratz, I., cited in op. cit. English, R., Terrorism, How to Respond, p. 5 (note 4). 
119 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 73 (note 6). 
120 See, for example, op. cit. Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J., and Breen Smyth, M., Terrorism, A Critical 
Introduction, pp. 115-20 (note 43). 
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are not definitive of the concept. The Policy Working Group on the United Nations and 
Terrorism, for example, argued that: ‘Without attempting a comprehensive definition of 
terrorism, it would be useful to delineate some broad characteristics of the phenomenon’121, 
and in 2004 the UN ad hoc Committee on terrorism referred to a ‘recommended 
‘description’’ of terrorism.122 Describing terrorism, however, is not an alternative to defining 
or conceptualizing the phenomenon because it doesn’t help us to classify what terrorism is or 
isn’t, or to determine what its parameters are – this needs a definition.  
A rarely acknowledged but formidable challenge arising from this author’s (and many 
others’) conceptualizations of terrorism is that it is extremely difficult to prove what 
constitutes an act of terrorism because it is hard to know what the intent or purpose is behind 
the act of violence. Roberta Senechal de la Roche argued that ‘we evaluate a scientific 
definition solely by its usefulness in the ordering of facts.’123 This clearly presents us with a 
problem – our definition, because it rests on intent, does not lend itself to the scrutiny of 
observable facts. Indeed, while there may be some cases where purported intent is expressed 
in relation to an act of political violence, this may not be the real intent and there are many 
more examples where we do not even have purported intent. How do we know, for example, 
whether wider psychological impact is the intent more than the physical effects of an act of 
violence?  
Thus, there may have been many acts of violence that have been labelled terrorism when, by 
our definition, there is little evidence that they are. This opens up a whole new subjective 
debate – indeed, this is arguably where the real subjectivity problem lies within the definition 
of terrorism. In the face of limited evidence, how do we know (and who decides) if an act of 
political violence is primarily designed to generate a wider psychological impact over its 
physical effect? This is arguably the most fundamental problem with my conception of 
terrorism – and indeed, for some, it may justify the view that any serious endeavour to 
grapple with the definitional issue is indeed a waste of effort.  
Perhaps we should simply define terrorism according to what is more readily observable in 
keeping with de la Roche’s ‘sole’ function or purpose of a definition, and to exclude the core 
element of intent altogether  – perhaps by focussing on tangibles such as incidents of the 
targeting of civilians (or non-combatants) in non-war environments (in keeping with 
international norms to do with the protection of civilians from any form of armed combat), 
and to gather data accordingly. But this compromises what this author, and many others, 
believe an act of terrorism to be. If we are comfortable with our conception of what terrorism 
                                                            
121 Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism, quoted in op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p. 56 (note 6). 
122 Op. cit. Schmid, A., (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research, p.60 (note 6). It has been argued 
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is then the challenge is to empirically prove what acts constitute terrorism and which ones do 
not. There is unfortunately no simple answer to the problem of proving intent, to determine 
that the psychological dimension is the primary purpose behind an act of violence. Yet, there 
is also no escaping the fact that it is this psychological dimension, where the immediate 
victims are not the real target of the ‘terrorist message’, that conventional academic wisdom 
sees as the essence of terrorism. Terrorism as a method is about intended psychological 
impact beyond the immediate target over and above anything else, and one should not alter its 
meaning simply to accommodate what might be more readily and conveniently observable, 
hence ‘the onus is upon the social scientist to establish intent’.124 
 
 
                                                            
124 Claridge, D., ‘State Terrorism? Applying a Definitional Model’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Volume 
8, No. 3, 1996, p. 51. 
